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Euroscepticism and the Return to Nationalism in the Wake of Accession as Part of the Europeanization Process in Central and Eastern Europe

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Introduction¹

When examining the new EU member states, it is often assumed that the existence of a *more pronounced Euroscepticism* is based on the experience of the approximation process. One reason given for this is the claim that during the approximation process, any nationalistic policy approaches were suppressed for the greater good of membership, due to the strong influence of the EU-Commission.

In order to answer the question of whether transformation processes have indeed slowed down, and whether a long-term commitment to values and norms promoted by the EU is still lacking in the new member states, we took a closer look at Euroscepticism in both old and new member states. We would not argue that a long-term commitment to values and norms promoted by the EU is still lacking, or that accession countries fulfilled certain demands only under pressure, and took the opportunity to back-pedal as soon as being full members of the club. On the contrary, we see the development of Eurosceptic parties as part of the Europeanization process the new members have gone through, and are still going through, especially in terms of *party Europeanization*. Therefore, while

1. This article represents the status of affairs as of February 2012. Political changes beyond that date have not been taken into consideration.

Eurosceptic parties differ from one country to another, *more commonalities than differences* in newer and older member states can be observed, and there is *no specific Euroscepticism* unique to new member states only. The failure of the constitutional treaty (due to the referenda in France and the Netherlands in 2005), the Irish “No” on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008 and the opt-out of the new Fiscal pact by the UK and the Czech Republic show more examples of Euroscepticism from old rather than new member states.

Unfortunately, the return to nationalism in the wake of accession has to be seen as part of a process of normalisation, as opposed to a divergence between old and new member states. It is part of a Europeanization process that comes with the EU gaining more salience in the national political discourse.² This will be shown in four steps: First, Europeanization and Party Europeanization will briefly be defined, second an approach to Euroscepticism, both in the public at large and on a party-basis, will be developed. Third, commonalities and differences of Euroscepticism in five member states (Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) based on their understanding of national identity will be introduced and, fourth, compared.

1. Europeanization and Party Europeanization

In order to show that Euroscepticism is part of a process of Europeanization, it is necessary to briefly define Europeanization. In the context of this analysis, Europeanization is not understood as an integrational bottom-up process, but exclusively as a top-down process. In general, this top-down Europeanization is defined as “*A set of processes through which the EU’s political, social and economic dynamics become part of the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.*”³

In this analysis, the focus lies on Party Europeanization, and thus on the processes that shape parties and their attitudes towards Europe. The EU’s influence in this case is not as active as it would be in, for example, the shaping of a member state or accession countries’ environmental policy, where influence would largely stem from the acquis. Instead, it is an indirect process based on the fact that the EU is a determinant for policy and is playing an increasing role in national party systems, party politics, campaigning and elections.⁴

2. Danica Fink-Hafner and Alenka Krasovec, “Europeanisation of the Slovenian party system - from marginal European impacts to the domestication of EU policy issues?,” *Politics in Central Europe* 2 (2006):1.

3. Claudio M. Radaell, “Whither Europeanization? Concept stretching and substantive change,” *European Integration Online Papers*. Last accessed 14 February 2012, <<http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-008.htm>>

4. Sylvia Kritzinger and Irina Michalowitz, “Party position changes through EU membership? The (non-) Europeanisation of Austrian, Finish and Swedish Political Parties,” *L’Harmattan, Politique européenne* 16:(2005) 19-51.

Party Europeanization, in this case, is indicated by the *salience* a party attributes to issues at the European level, by the *policy positions a party holds towards European issues*, and whether there is a change in these positions.⁵ In this context, the development of Euroscepticism at a national level is a central aspect of reorientation of positions with regard to Europe.⁶

2. Euroscepticism: Defining the issue at hand

From the 1960s until the 1980s, European integration was generally understood as an elite driven phenomenon for which the public was seen as having a *permissive consensus* for integration.⁷

Scholars argued that public opinion shapes national choices, but does not directly affect the evolution of the European project.⁸ This view changed in the early 1990s with the Danish referendum that rejected the Maastricht Treaty, and a growing understanding that there might have been less permissive consensus than previously assumed, possibly in connection with the perception of a democratic deficit.⁹ Since then, scholars and politicians have paid more attention to the concept of *Euroscepticism*. Euroscepticism is not a uniform phenomenon, but differs between countries on degree and dimensions (types), as well as over time. Euroscepticism is best defined as “*a general term for opposition to the process of European integration*”.¹⁰

2.1. Euroscepticism in the public of the EU member states

When taking a closer look at the research on permissive consensus and recent Eurobarometer data, the results are mixed. Laumen and Maurer come to the conclusion that the public's orientation towards Europe has not undergone fundamental change in the course of the referenda on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005.¹¹

5. Ibid.: 20.

6. Interestingly this article shows how the development of Eurosceptic parties changes over a relatively short period of time (seven years) as the authors saw the FPÖ as weakened and did not yet observe an anti-EU party in Finland.

7. Anne Laumen and Andreas Maurer, “Jenseits des Permissive Consensus. Bevölkerungsorientierungen gegenüber Europäischer Integration im Wandel?” *Diskussionspapier Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*. (2006); Lindberg, Leon and Stuart A. Scheingold, *Europe's would be polity: Patterns of change in the European Community*. Prentice Hall, 1970.

8. Helle Schröder Hansen, *Euroscepticism - A multinational understanding of the concept and a comparative analysis of public scepticism in Britain and Denmark*. Master Thesis Aalborg University Denmark, 2008.

9. Ibid.: 8.

10. Krisztina Arato and Petr Kaniok, “Euroscepticism and European Integration,” *Political Science Research Centre Zagreb* (2009).

11. Anne Laumen and Andreas Maurer, “Jenseits des Permissive Consensus. Bevölkerungsorientierungen gegenüber Europäischer Integration im Wandel?” *Diskussionspapier Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik* (2006).

When analysing whether economic rationality or identity are the main drives for public opinion on European integration, Hooghe and Marks come to the conclusion that citizens who are fearful of the economic future, both subjectively and objectively, will collectively and individually lean towards Euroscepticism (2004: 2), while national identity can either reinforce or undermine support for European integration.¹² They show that national identity and its connection to Euro-support or -scepticism develops within *unique national contexts*: While the English Euroscepticism is based on the British history of empire, Germans are pro-European as they see it as a peace project after World War II, while Spain sees it as a way to modernize and democratize.¹³ National identity is not strongly linked to Euroscepticism in all member states, as it is the case in the UK.¹⁴ But the more a country's elite is divided, and the more elements within the country mobilize against European integration, the more national identity is seen as exclusive and not compatible with a European identity.

*Political parties are decisive in cueing the public, and the wider their disagreement, the more exclusive identity is mobilized against European Integration.*¹⁵

Therefore, polarized elites are necessary for national identity to have a Eurosceptic effect. In this regard, the article will deal with Eurosceptic parties in the following sections.

2.2. Party-based Euroscepticism: classification and definition

Party-based Euroscepticism is defined as expressing “*the idea of contingent or qualified opposition as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration*”.¹⁶ Currently, there are three dominant classifications of Euroscepticism—two of which will be presented here. They develop

12. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PSO online*. University of North Carolina, 2007.

13. *Ibid.*: 2.

14. This is also reflected in current Eurobarometer data. Concerning the general opinion on the EU's image, the highest total positive, i.e. very or fairly positive, is achieved in Bulgaria followed by Romania and Lithuania. The highest total negative, i.e. fairly or very negative, is reached in the UK followed by Austria and Greece (Standard Eurobarometer 76 2011: 49). Concerning the question whether they trust the European Parliament, UK ranks highest in not trusting the EP (68%) (*Eurobarometer*, Standard Eurobarometer 76, in 2011 Public Opinion, last accessed 13 February 2012, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/76/eb76_anx_en.pdf>.)

15. *Ibid.*: 3.

16. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, “Theorising Party-Based Euroscepticism: Problems of definition, measurement and causality.” *SEI Working Paper no. 69*, (2003) Sussex European Institute.

from a more general binary distinction,¹⁷ via one distinguishing four different groups,¹⁸ to one identifying six different groups.¹⁹

Generally, Euroscepticism can range from hard to soft Euroscepticism.²⁰ Hard Euroscepticism is a principled opposition to the EU and European integration, and a desire for national withdrawal from the EU. Soft Euroscepticism, on the other hand, is a qualified opposition to certain policies based on perceived threats to national interests.

A more detailed differentiation is proposed by Flood and Usherwood's gradual classification, which we combined with the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism. This classification distinguishes six categories, of which the first three cannot be considered Eurosceptic:

1. Maximalists are strongly in favour of European integration, both in general and for specific policies,
2. Reformists combine a general acceptance of advancing integration with constructive criticism,
3. Gradualists accept slow and piecemeal advances of integration.

The three categories below show a slightly more nuanced differentiation than the binary hard/soft Europeanization:

1. Minimalists accept the *status quo* while rejecting further advances in integration,
2. Revisionists want to return to an earlier state of integration, e.g. before a treaty revision, and
3. Rejectionists outright refuse integration in general and oppose membership more specifically.²¹

17. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, *The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States* (Paper prepared for presentation at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Workshops, 2002).

18. Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde distinguish between general support of (Europhiles), or general opposition to (Europhobes), European integration in principle. On a second level, they distinguish EU-optimists from EU-pessimists. This leads to four ideal type categories of party positions on Europe: Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics, Eurorejects and Europragmatists (Petr Kopecky and Cas Mudde, "The two sides of Euroscepticism," *Party Positions* (2002): 301-303). When analysing the Eurosceptic parties in EU member states, this distinction did not seem particularly useful, however.

19. Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood, *Positions, dispositions, transitions: A model of Group alignment on EU integration*. (2005) Department of political, international and policy studies University of Surrey.

20. Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, *The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States*. (Paper prepared for presentation at the European Consortium for Political Research Joint Workshops, 2002).

21. Christopher Flood and Simon Usherwood, *Positions, dispositions, transitions: A model of Group alignment on EU integration*. (2005).

The analysis of Eurosceptic parties below will draw on Taggart and Szczerbiak 2002, as well as on Flood and Usherwood 2005.

The explanations for the *sources of Euroscepticism* vary, but many scholars argue that a cost-benefit analysis of economic impact, a general distrust of European institutions including a perceived democratic deficit, and a (perceived) threat to national identity are primary sources.²² According to the economic *cost-benefit analysis*, or utilitarian explanation, people in Europe will make calculations according to whether they believe that the European Union economically helps or hurts them, and then will decide whether they support the EU according to this assessment. Thus,

*in the wealthiest, most capital-rich member states we expect unskilled workers to be Eurosceptic and managers and professionals to be Eurosupportive, while in the poorest, most labor-rich member states we expect the reverse.*²³

An alternative explanation of the sources for Euroscepticism is that European citizens perceive EU institutions as lacking *democratic accountability*, and thus exhibit a democratic deficit.²⁴ There is much debate over the definition and presence of a democratic deficit. However, according to McCormick, the democratic deficit is “*the gap between the powers of the European institutions and the ability of European citizens to influence their work and decisions*”.²⁵ This perceived democratic deficit manifests itself in the conviction that the EU bodies are generally not accountable to citizens, the European Parliament as the only directly elected body is too weak, and the EU has strengthened executive power at the expense of national parliaments.²⁶ Regardless of the existence of such a deficit, public

22. Lauren McLaren, “Public support for the European Union: Cost/ Benefit Analysis or perceived cultural threat,” *The Journal of Politics* 64 (2) (2003); McLaren Explaining mass-level euroscepticism: Identity, interests, and institutional distrust. Prepared for the first of two workshops on Euroscepticism 1-2, Pulitzer Hotel, Amsterdam. (2005); Sean Carey, “Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European integration?” *European Union Politics* 3 (4)(2002): 387-413; Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PSO online*. (2004) University of North Carolina, Hooghe, Liesbet, “What drives Euroscepticism? Party Public Cueing, ideology and strategic opportunity,” *European Union Politics* (2007) 8:5.

23. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PSO online*, University of North Carolina, 2007.

24. Hansen, *Euroscepticism - A multinational understanding of the concept and a comparative analysis of public scepticism in Britain and Denmark*, 2008.

25. John McCormick, *Understanding the European Union - a concise introduction*. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 135.

26. Hansen, *Euroscepticism - A multinational understanding of the concept and a comparative analysis of public scepticism in Britain and Denmark*, 2008. The actual existence of a democratic deficit can be contested by arguing that national democratic models should be run by a democratically elected national government, which is a democratic feature (Andrew Moravcsik, “In defence of the democratic deficit: Reassessing the legitimacy of the European Union,” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (4) (2002). In addition, it seems that there is a high congruence between voters and their national MPs regarding issues of European integration: Hermann Schmitt,

perception of the democratic deficit has an impact on support for European integration, especially in countries that have well-functioning national democracies.²⁷

Besides the cost-benefit analysis explanation, feelings of *national identity* or national sovereignty can also have an impact on Eurosceptic attitudes.²⁸ This is the first and strongest common denominator of Eurosceptic parties, upon which they base their political programs. The conceptions of nation, national identity, and nationalism are all difficult to define, much less to analyse.²⁹ Andersen argues that a nation is imagined by its inhabitants, as they do not personally know all the other people in the nation. The nation is imagined as a limited (spatially and by population) and sovereign community, that embodies a “*deep horizontal comradeship*”.³⁰ A sense of community is solidified through either a common culture or civic ideology (Western civic nationalism), or through ethnicity.³¹ It is commonly recognized that one of the most popular ways of defining a nation is in contrast to other established nations.³² It is also possible to contrast the nation against other ethnic or political groups to achieve a similar effect. It is important to keep in mind that exclusive national identity, i.e. negatively oriented to multiculturalism, is also negatively oriented towards European integration, while an inclusive national identity that allows for several levels of identity (regional, national) does not need to be Eurosceptic.³³

Sovereignty is seen as a zero-sum game by Eurosceptics,³⁴ i.e. it is granted to bigger EU states if given up by smaller ones, and not as a win-win situation. Domestic audiences will be more Eurosceptic when they have strong feelings of national identity, low feelings of European identity, and they are worried about the degradation of this national identity by outsiders.³⁵ This perceived threat from outsiders could be in the form of either realistic or symbolic threats. Realistic

“Better than it used to be? New evidence on the congruence of voters and their national MPs regarding the issue of European integration,” *Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung*, 2010.

27. Robert Rohrschneider, “The democracy deficit and mass support for an EU-Wide Government,” *American Journal of Political Science* 46 (2002): 463-475.

28. Sara De Master and Michael K. Le Roy, “Xenophobia and the European Union,” *Comparative Politics* 32 (2000) (4).

29. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (2006).

30. *Ibid.*

31. Anthony D. Smith, “National identity,” *University of Nevada Press* (1991).

32. Ivaylo Ditchchev, “The Eros of Identity. In Dusan Bjelic, Obrad Savic. Eds. Balkans as metaphor between globalization and fragmentation,” *Cambridge, Mass* (2002) 235-251.

33. Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, “Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?” *PSO online*. (University of North Carolina, 2007).

34. Hansen, *Euro-scepticism - A multinational understanding of the concept and a comparative analysis of public scepticism in Britain and Denmark*, 38.

35. Sean Carey, “Undivided loyalties: Is national identity an obstacle to European integration?” *European Union Politics* 3 (4) (2002) 387-413; Lauren McLaren, “Public support for the European Union: Cost/ Benefit Analysis or perceived cultural threat,” *Journal of Politics* 64 (2) (2003).

threats appear when hostility toward another group is based on the (perceived) threat the other group poses to the resources of one's own group, such as the belief that minority populations are abusing the welfare system. Symbolic or abstract threats are concerns that are not about resource distribution, but rather the concern that another group will threaten the culture or way of life of one's own group, including the fear that the religion or culture of the minority group is going to endanger 'our way of life'.

3. Commonalities and Differences of Euroscepticism in different member states

When looking at the EU member states, what are the commonalities and differences concerning their Euroscepticism? Based on the assumption that Euroscepticism cannot be divided between old and new member states, as it would gloss over commonalities and differences both among these groups and within them, and in order to better understand Euroscepticism, we conducted a country-by-country and party-by-party analysis, to tease out the commonalities of these Eurosceptic groups.

In a survey on national identity in the CEECs, the European Commission names several aspects of *national identity*, which it sees as closely connected to the perception of sovereignty.³⁶ Some of these aspects overlap with old member state's experience, while others, most notably 40 years of communist experience, are specific to the CEECs. When taking a closer look at these countries' individual conceptions of national identity, however, it becomes clear that there is a large variation within this group as well. Historically, beyond the last forty years, the region has a diverse experience. While Poland and Lithuania were large kingdoms in the Northeast, others used to be under the influence of the Habsburg empire, and others in the southeast were under the Ottoman empire.³⁷ More recently, Bulgaria was strongly pro-Soviet and Romania was under the reign of the Neo-Stalinist Ceaucescu, while Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia kept the idea of independence alive throughout Soviet dominance,³⁸ with Poland and Hungary as the least sovietised of these countries.³⁹

36. European Commission, "Survey of National Identity and deep-seated attitudes towards European integration in the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper, *The Forward Studies Unit*, (1998): 5.

37. Liesbet Hooghe, "What drives Euroscepticism? Party Public Cueing, ideology and strategic opportunity." *European Union Politics* 8 (2007):5; Georg P. Hefty, "Stolze Selbstbefreier." *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 31. Januar 2012; Florian Hartleb, "Gegen Globalisierung und Demokratie. Die NPD als eine neue soziale Bewegung im europäischen Kontext?" *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* (2009): 115-127.

38. European Commission, "Survey of National Identity and deep-seated attitudes towards European integration in the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper, *The Forward Studies Unit*, (1998): 14.

39. *Ibid.*: 14, 15.

Citizens of some of the CEECs such as the Polish and the Czechs, but also Hungarians and Romanians, have always considered themselves European like Germany or France. For others, like the Baltic States and Slovakia and Slovenia, EU membership is a crucial factor in their question of independence (in the case of the Baltic States, independence from Russia). And while some like Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Lithuania have a long national history, for others such as Romania and Slovakia, their national history is a relatively modern phenomenon.⁴⁰ In the 1990s, political parties in the CEEC did not reflect socioeconomic cleavages and were considered a weak element in the democratisation process.⁴¹ Citizens in these countries were highly polarised on anti-communist or nationalist lines, and showed low membership in new political parties after feeling apathy and opposition to forced membership in the communist party. This led to the formation of new parties around strong personalities, a stronger interest and higher trust in president than parliament, and a low turn-out at elections due to a feeling of powerlessness.⁴² However, when looking at voter turn-out at the last parliamentary elections in EU member states, differences between eastern and western Europe are marginal: voter turn-out in Slovakia (59%) is comparable to Portugal (59,7%), the turn-out in Hungary (64,4%) and Slovenia (63,1%) is comparable to that in the UK (65,5%), and the average voter turn-out in 2009 and 2010 in the EU-15 was roughly 70,5%, whereas in the EU-25 it was 67%, while the fact that voting is obligatory in Belgium and Luxembourg needs to be taken into consideration.⁴³ Fears of losing national identity due to European integration are not exclusive to the 2004/07 enlargements. They were present in public debates on EU membership in all enlargement rounds.⁴⁴

Currently many far right nationalist parties in Europe have used a technique of contrasting the uniqueness of their national identity against the conglomerate European Union. This tendency has led to widespread Euroscepticism among far-right nationalist parties. However, this Euroscepticism is usually related to other issues such as immigration and national identity, and is rarely (the UK being somewhat of an exception to this general trend) the main goal of these parties.

Based on these findings, the individual national histories and Eurosceptic parties of several EU member states will be analysed. We have chosen a total of five

40. Ibid.: 11.

41. Ibid.: 17.

42. Ibid.: 17.

43. Eurostat, *Wählerbeteiligung an nationalen und EU Parlamentswahlen.*, last accessed 23 February 2012 <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=TSDGO310>. This difference becomes more pronounced when looking at EP elections, however.

44. European Commission, "Survey of National Identity and deep-seated attitudes towards European integration in the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper, *The Forward Studies Unit*, (1998): 29.

EU member states (Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), which have been prominent in the discussion about Euroscepticism, and we will extract the common strands that form the basis for Euroscepticism in these states. In addition, reference will be made to Eurosceptic parties in other countries.

3.1. *Bulgaria: Ataka*

Bulgaria's national identity has been heavily influenced by struggles against foreign domination from Byzantium, the Ottoman Empire, and the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ The early Bulgarian state was in constant conflict with Byzantium—from 1366-1878 it was occupied, and became a province of the Ottoman Empire. In 1878, an independent Bulgarian state emerged after the Russo-Turkish war, even though it was technically considered a vassal state to the Turkish Empire. This new state was only 1/3 of the territory that the Bulgarians considered to be their traditional territory, many ethnic Bulgarians lived outside its borders, and there were many ethnic minorities that lived within the borders of this new state.⁴⁶ Out of this fragmented history, the Bulgarians began the process of rebuilding a sense of national identity.

This identity has two forms: one was a rejection of Turkish influence and followed along the lines of ethnic nationalism, and the other was a civic nationalism that attempted to accommodate the many ethnic minorities into the Bulgarian state.⁴⁷ However, after the Bulgarian defeat in the Second Balkans war, as well as both World Wars, the Bulgarians reacted by blaming and persecuting non-ethnic Bulgarians. This also occurred in the later part of Bulgarian Communist rule, where the Communist Party tried to preserve its legitimacy by emphasizing an ethnic national identity, at the expense of ethnic minorities, such as Turks and Pomaks.⁴⁸ This same strategy is being used to some extent by current nationalist Bulgarian political parties, such as Ataka.

Ataka (Attack) is the primary ultra-nationalist Eurosceptic party in Bulgaria. It was formed in 2005, and it won 14% of the vote in the 2007 European Parlia-

45. European Commission, "Survey of National Identity and deep-seated attitudes towards European integration in the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper, *The Forward Studies Unit* (1998).

46. Maya Kosseva, Antonina Zhelyazkova, and Marko Hajdinjak, "Catching up with the uncatchable: European dilemmas and identity construction on Bulgarian path to modernity," *International Center for Minority Studies and Intercultural Relations* (2009).

47. *Ibid.*

48. *Ibid.*

ment elections.⁴⁹ In 2009 it won 9% of votes in the Bulgarian national election.⁵⁰ Ataka's goal is to "bring Bulgaria back to the Bulgarians", and it subsequently asserts the supremacy of the state and the "Bulgarian nation" above ethnic and religious diversity.⁵¹ Ataka is not principally opposed to EU membership. However it has demanded the revision of some aspects of its accession agreement, including the forced closure of the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant. Overall, it can thus be classified as a minimalist/soft Eurosceptic party.

3.2. Finland: The True Finns

Like Hungary (see below), Finland's national identity is heavily impacted by a history of foreign interference. However, one of the results of this interference has been to emphasize the Finnish language, rather than emphasize the Magyar ethnicity. The focus on Finnish language as a major component of Finnish national identity means that many sources about Finnish history, culture, and politics are in Finnish only. Immigrants make up a mere 2.9% of the population.⁵² However, in a 2010 survey, 60% of the population opposed more immigration, which was up from 36% in 2007.⁵³ Despite antiimmigrant attitudes, the Finnish population is generally favourable towards the EU. According to the 2009 Eurobarometer, 51% of Finns considered Finland's membership in the EU to be positive, compared to only 20% who view it to be a negative thing.⁵⁴

In Finland, the main nationalist Eurosceptic party is the populist True Finns led by Timo Soini. The True Finns do not fit easily on the left wing-right wing political continuum: They are far right when it comes to protecting Finnish national identity and preventing immigration, but they have left-leaning social policies and support welfare for Finnish citizens.⁵⁵ They are opposed to Finnish funds being used in European bailouts. A well-known quote by Timo Soini states that

49. *Sofia News Agency*, "Bulgaria Votes 2009," in 2009, last accessed 5 July 2011. <<http://www.novinite.com/elections2009/parties.php?id=1>>

50. *BBC*, "Bulgaria opposition wins election," 6 July 2009, last accessed 5 July 2011, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8134851.stm>>

51. *Sofia News Agency*, "Bulgaria Votes 2009," in 2009, last accessed 5 July 2011. <<http://www.novinite.com/elections2009/parties.php?id=1>>

52. *Nationmaster*, "Finnish Immigration Statistics," last accessed 20 July 2011, <<http://www.nationmaster.com/country/finland/imm-immigration>>

53. *Helsingin Sanomat*, "Survey: Finns' attitudes toward immigration have become more negative," last accessed 20 July 2011, <<http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Survey+Finns%E2%80%99+attitudes+toward+immigration+have+become+more+negative/1135254422096>>

54. European Commission, "Survey of National Identity and deep-seated attitudes towards European integration in the ten applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe," Working Paper, *The Forward Studies Unit*, (1998).

55. Jon Worth, "The True Finns followed a well-known recipe for success," *The Guardian.co.uk* on 21 April 2011, last accessed 9 June 2011, <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/apr/21/true-finns-nationalist-populists-european-parties>>

“Wherever the EU is, there’s a problem”.⁵⁶ The True Finn’s platform is centred on protecting Finnish national identity and they are opposed to immigration, as well as the mandatory teaching of Swedish in public schools.⁵⁷ In the last elections the True Finns won 19% of the vote, which made them the third largest party in Finland.⁵⁸

The True Finns see bailout to Greece and Portugal as a “*bad deal*” for Finland and want to “*pay less to Brussels*”.⁵⁹ They state that “*Basic Finnish immigration policy should be based on the fact that the Finns should always be able to decide for themselves the conditions under which a foreigner can come to our country and reside in our country.*”⁶⁰ Despite some hard Eurosceptic statements, overall, they can be classified as a revisionist/soft Eurosceptic party.

3.3. Hungary: Jobbik

Hungary’s current national identity has been largely influenced by the Treaty of Trianon, signed on 5 June 1920, following Hungary’s defeat in WWI. The treaty was imposed without negotiation, and it reduced Hungary’s territory from 283,000 square km to 93,000 square km and its population from 15.2 million to 7.6 million.⁶¹ This resulted in a large amount of ethnic Magyars becoming minorities in neighbouring countries, and led to Hungary’s national identity not being primarily defined by geography.

Hungary’s experience with the Soviet imposition of communism also has had an impact on its national identity. Throughout this period, Hungarian society rejected communism,⁶² and after the downfall of the communist system in 1989, scholars predicted that the future would be determined by either European cosmopolitanism or nationalist ideology.⁶³ As it turns out, both of these tendencies have been seen since 1989. In 2003, the Hungarian referendum for EU membership showed 84% in favour, which showcased support for European cosmopoli-

56. Arja Alho, “The Finland We Have Lost: Country Analysis in the Run-Up to the National Elections.” *Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung* (2008).

57. *BBC*, “True Finns’ nationalism colours Finland election,” 15 April 2011, last accessed 8 June 2011, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13091920>>

58. *Der Spiegel*, “Europäischer Rechtsruck: Auftritt der Anti-Euro-Krieger,” 18.4.2011, last accessed 7 November 2011, <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,757699,00.html>>

59. Gavin Hewitt, “Finland rocks the EU,” *BBC* on 18 April 2011, last accessed 9 June 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/gavinhe Witt/2011/04/finland_rocks_the_eu.html>

60. Jon Worth, “The True Finns followed a well-known recipe for success,” *The Guardian.co.uk* on 21 April 2011,

61. Richard Frucht, *Ed. Eastern Europe: an introduction to the people, lands, and culture*. (2005).

62. Barnabas Racz, “The Hungarian Socialists in Opposition: Stagnation or Renaissance,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 52 (2) (2000): 319-347.

63. Hilde Weiss, “A Cross-National Comparison of Nationalism in Austria, the Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland,” *Political Psychology* 24(2) (2003): 377-401.

tanism, even though only 46% of the population turned out to vote.⁶⁴ However, during the period from 1995 and 2003, ethnocentrism has also increased.⁶⁵ Recently far-right populist parties, such as Jobbik, have placed social reunification of ethnic Hungarians at the top of their agenda, but this emphasis on ethnicity has also been accompanied by xenophobia, especially towards the Roma minority in Hungary.⁶⁶

The Jobbik party is led by Gabor Vona. In the last parliamentary elections, Jobbik won 16.7 per cent of the vote, which put it in third place.⁶⁷ Jobbik is vehemently nationalistic and opposes any aspects of European integration that make Europe anything more than a league of traditional sovereign nation states. Jobbik asserts its main goal is the “*reunification of a Hungarian nation*” and “*reincorporation into the national body of both Western and Carpathian-basin Hungarians*”, by establishing “*protective power*” of the “*motherland*” over Hungarians in other countries, offering these ethnic Hungarians citizenship in Hungary and promoting the “*economic and cultural reunification of the Hungarian nation*”.⁶⁸ The other side of the desire to reunify ethnic Hungarians is the vilification of the Roma (often referred to by Jobbik with the pejorative term ‘Gypsies’) living in Hungary. Jobbik asserts that many Gypsies do not want to work, that they take advantage of the welfare system and that they are responsible for a large part of crime. Subsequently, Jobbik states that it wants to solve the “*gypsy problem*” albeit through legislative means, which would effectively force Roma to become more Hungarian and abandon their cultural traditions.

In regards to the European Union, Jobbik states their objectives as “*the rejection of the Lisbon Treaty and of a United States of Europe which the treaty is designed to facilitate, the promotion with allies of the concept of a Europe of the Nations, the achievement of Hungarian interests without compromise*”.⁶⁹ Although the leaders of Jobbik want Hungary to remain in the EU, their rhetoric disparages the EU and calls for Hungary to focus eastwards to strengthen Hungary’s position by uniting with other eastern “*descendants of Attila [the Hun]*”⁷⁰ in order to gain greater

64. Gabriel Partos, “Hungary’s EU apathy,” *BBC* on 14 April 2003, last accessed 24 June 2011, <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2946963.stm>>

65. György Csepeli, Antal Örkény, Mária Székelyi and János Poór, “National Identity in Hungary at the Turn of the Millennium,” *TÁRKI Social Report Reprint Series no. 27* (2005): 456-468.

66. *Ibid.*

67. *The Swedish Wire*, “Europe’s biggest far right parties,” 16 January 2011, last accessed 8 June 2011 <<http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/8086-europes-biggest-far-right-parties>>

68. Jobbik on 17 February 2011, Gábor Vona strategic speech outlining Jobbik plan of action for the coming years, last accessed 13 July 2011 <<http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/3196.html>>

69. *Ibid.*

70. Gabor Vona, “Turanism Instead of Euro-Atlantic Alliance!” Jobbik on 12 April 2011, last accessed 13 July 2011 <<http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/3198.html>>

autonomy and national prosperity, which characterizes Jobbik as revisionists/hard Eurosceptics.

3.4. *The Netherlands: Freedom Party*

Traditionally, Dutch national identity has been built on the principles of tolerance and multiculturalism. This identity has relied on the *pillarisation* of society, where each dominant religious/ideological group had a largely autonomous pillar with its own schools, organizations, etc., and national unity was achieved through elite level cooperation between the pillars.⁷¹ Dutch society has responded to Islamic immigration primarily from Morocco and Turkey by establishing a new Islamic pillar, in addition to the Protestant and Catholic pillars, with support for Islamic schools, etc. However, this has changed in a large part following the highly publicized murders of the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn by an animal rights extremist, and filmmaker Theo van Gogh by the son of a Moroccan immigrant, who claimed that “*the [Islamic] law compels me to chop off the head of anyone who insults Allah and the prophet*”.⁷² This murder shocked the Dutch population, and led to serious questions about the feasibility of a Dutch national identity based on multiculturalism and tolerance in the face of Islamic fundamentalism.⁷³ Currently, the Netherlands seems to be in a crisis of its national identity.⁷⁴

The ensuing increased support for politicians such as Geert Wilders of the far right nationalist and Eurosceptic Freedom Party, has helped manifest Dutch Euroscepticism, especially in areas related to European control over immigration policies and free movement of people. The Freedom Party holds 24 of the 150 seats in the lower house, and is currently the third largest party.⁷⁵ Wilders’ platform is primarily anti-Islamic: he opposes Islamic immigrants, and has compared the Koran to *Mein Kampf* and stated that it should be banned.⁷⁶ However, he also holds Eurosceptic views. According to some scholars, the Dutch population has grown increasingly Eurosceptic during the period from 1990–2008, mostly due to perceived ethnic threat to the Dutch national identity posed by increased

71. Frans H. Doppen, “Citizenship education and the Dutch national identity debate,” *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 5 (2) (2010): 131–143; Jan Erk, “Red, white and Orange: Dominant nationalism in France and the Netherlands Compared,” University of Leiden (2010).

72. Ian Burma, “Letter from Amsterdam,” *The New Yorker* on 3 January 2005, *BBC*, “Van Gogh killer jailed for life,” 26 July 2005, last accessed 23 June 2011, <<http://www.jobbik.com/jobbik-announcements/3198.html>>

73. Alan Quartly, “Attacks harden Dutch attitudes,” *BBC* on 1 December 2004, last accessed 23 June 2011 <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4057645.stm>>

74. Frans H. Doppen, “Citizenship education and the Dutch national identity debate,” *Education, Citizenship and Social Justice* 5 (2) (2010): 131–143; Jan Erk, “Red, white and Orange: Dominant nationalism in France and the Netherlands Compared,” University of Leiden (2010).

75. *The Swedish Wire*, “Europe’s biggest far right parties,” 16 January 2011, last accessed 8 June 2011 <<http://www.swedishwire.com/politics/8086-europes-biggest-far-right-parties>>

76. Juliane Von Mittelstaedt, “Der Angsthändler,” *Der Spiegel* on 9 November 2009, last accessed 8 June 2011 <<http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/d-67682719.html>>

immigration, and this can help to explain Wilders' recent success and popularity.⁷⁷ Wilders and his Freedom Party are staunchly antiimmigrant, especially towards Islamic immigrants. By setting up a website where Dutch can complain about citizens from CEE countries, Wilders implicitly attacks the freedom of movement.⁷⁸ Wilders is also vocal in opposing the Netherlands giving money to the EU to bail out states such as Greece and Portugal.

He uses a colourful nationalist language to argue that the EU is taking the money from hard working citizens in the Netherlands and using it to help bail out the economies of Greece, Spain and Portugal, whose financial troubles he largely attributes to the laziness of their citizens.⁷⁹ Wilders wants the Netherlands to have financial autonomy from Brussels, and wants domestic control over immigration, both of which are hard Eurosceptic, revisionist positions.

3.5. United Kingdom: United Kingdom Independence Party

The basis for British national identity is seen in British exceptionalism based on 'physical removal' from the continent, a feeling of resentment towards Germany after WWII, and the struggle to develop a new identity after the loss of its empire.⁸⁰ The main British Eurosceptic party is the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). It is generally considered to be far-right and populist, and its main stance is withdrawal from the EU. It states that the EU "*is a political project designed to take control of all the main functions of national governments*".⁸¹ It also has a platform of 'freedom from overcrowding' caused by immigrants, and supports a five year ban on immigration and speedy deportation of up to a million illegal immigrants.⁸² Although the UKIP only has two seats in the House of Lords, in the 2009 European Parliament elections, it came in second place behind the Conservatives, with 16.5 per cent of the vote, and 13 MEPs. It can be considered a hard Eurosceptic, rejectionist party.

While the UKIP is the primary party that has built its platform around total withdrawal from the EU, sentiments against certain aspects of the EU can be found in most British parties including the Conservatives and the Labour Party. These offer "soft" objections to particular EU policies and can, therefore, be con-

77. Marcel Lubbers and Eva Jaspers, "A longitudinal study of euroscepticism in the Netherlands: 2008 versus 1990," *European Union Politics*. (2011).

78. *Zeit-Online*, "Wilders-Website empört Osteuropäer," 2012, last accessed 23 February 2012, <<http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2012-02/wilders-webseite-niederlande>>

79. *Der Spiegel*, "Europäischer Rechtsruck: Auftritt der Anti-Euro-Krieger," on 18 April 2011, last accessed 7 November 2011, <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,757699,00.html>>

80. Menno Spiering, "British Euroscepticism," *European Studies* (20) (2004) 127-149.

81. UKIP Manifesto 2005, *We Want Our Country Back*. Birmingham: UK Independence Party. (2005).

82. Helen Margetts, Peter John and Stuart Weir, "Latent Support for the Far-Right in British Politics: The BNP and UKIP in the 2004 European and London Elections," (presented at the *PSA EPOP Conference*, University of Oxford, 10-12 September, 2004).

sidered soft Eurosceptics or Minimalists. Of the main British political parties, the Conservatives have been identified as the most Eurosceptic.⁸³ Although they would, according to their website, believe that Britain should “*play a leading role in an enlarged European Union, but that no further areas of power should be transferred to Brussels without a referendum*”,⁸⁴ which Flood/Usherwood would classify as Minimalist. In line with this, they support amending the 1972 European Communities Act so that any future treaty that transfers more competences to the EU would be subject to a referendum.⁸⁵ They have introduced a United Kingdom Sovereignty clause reaffirming that Parliament has the ultimate authority, pledged that Britain will not join the Euro⁸⁶ and called for reducing immigration to the UK, especially by unskilled workers from places outside of the EU.⁸⁷

As Britain is not in the Schengen Zone, this immigration policy is not explicitly anti-EU, but it goes against the spirit of freedom of movement in the EU, and the EU’s efforts towards a common immigration policy. While none of these positions are a principled rejection of the EU, they offer specific objections to particular areas of the EU, especially in the area of the relationship between national sovereignty and the EU.

A classification of Euroscepticism

| <i>Soft/Hard Euroscepticism (Taggart/Szczerbiak)</i> | <i>Classification according to Flood/Underwood</i> | <i>Eurosceptic Parties</i> |
|--|--|--|
| | Maximalist | |
| | Reformist | |
| | Gradualist | |
| Soft Euroscepticism | Minimalist | Ataka (Bulgaria) also: Conservatives (UK) Sweden Democrats |
| | Revisionist | Front National (France), True Finns, Danish People’s Party |
| Hard Euroscepticism | | The Freedom Party (Netherlands), Jobbik (Hungary) |
| | Rejectionist | UKIP (UK), also: FPÖ |

83. Charles Grant, “Why is Britain eurosceptic?” *Center for European Reform Essays*. (2008).

84. *Conservatives*, “Where we stand: Europe,” 2011, last accessed 4 July 2011, <http://www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Europe.aspx>

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*

87. Corey Flintoff, “Who’s Who In British Politics,” *NPR* on 7 May 2010, last accessed 23 February 2012, <<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126531361>>

4. Comparison of Euro-sceptic arguments on national identity

A common basis for Euro-sceptic arguments against the EU is that it will endanger national identity. This argument follows the logic of the national identity explained above—Euro-sceptic parties seek to protect their national identity, from both realistic and symbolic perceived threats from membership in the EU. Far-right parties have merged both Euro-scepticism and fear of immigrants (predominantly Islamic immigrants) as the basis of their far right platform.⁸⁸

4.1. Perceived Symbolic Threats

The main symbolic threat echoed in the rhetoric of the far right parties previously listed is the danger that Europe will become the United States of Europe, where individual nations will lose their sovereignty and individuality. These parties universally favour a Europe of nations, where nations retain control over the traditionally sovereign areas of currency, citizenship, foreign policy, and border controls. They argue that if the EU is allowed to control these aspects of traditional state sovereignty, the nation state will no longer have control of its destiny, and its national identity will erode.

All of the parties have anti-immigrant preferences, but two of the most outspoken are the True Finns in Finland and the Danish People's Party (DF) in Denmark. They argue that without internal border checks they will not be able to repel the tide of immigrants that pour into southern countries such as Italy, then migrate freely to their countries and undermine their traditional national identity. Both of these parties oppose the freedom of movement and instead favour the resumption of national control of national borders. Denmark has gone so far as reinstating internal border checks for a brief period.⁸⁹

4.2. Perceived Realistic Threats

The primary realistic threat is the fear that recent European bailouts will take national funds and give them to other European nations. Especially vocal in this area are the True Finns and Geert Wilder's Freedom Party. The leader of the True Finns, Timo Soini, has stated that "*Finnish cows must be milked in Finland and we shouldn't send their milk for charity outside the borders of this country*".⁹⁰ This is a classic example of perceived realistic threat that people outside of the national

88. Sara De Master, and Michael K. Le Roy, "Xenophobia and the European Union," *Comparative Politics* 32 (2000) (4).

89. Quentin Boulanger, "The future presidency of the EU Council reestablishes border control," *The New Federalist* on 15 July 2011, last accessed 29 July 2011, <<http://www.thenewfederalist.eu/The-future-presidency-of-the-EU-Council-reestablishes-border-control.>>

90. *The Guardian*, "Skeptical of bailouts, immigration, True Finns rock Finnish election and stun Europe," 18 April 2011, last accessed 15 June 2011, <<http://www.theguardian.pe.ca/Canada---World/Soci>>

group will sap the resources of the nation. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders is also vocally opposed to sending money to Brussels to be used to bail out Portugal, Greece, and Spain, which he calls lazy.⁹¹ Both of these attacks on bailouts are motivated by the desire to keep nation's resources under control of the nation, and are examples of perceived realist threats. However, they do not accurately reflect the benefits provided by the EU in the areas of trade, etc., and thus disproportionately represent the costs of membership.

4.3. *Policy Fields*

As shown in the previous two subsections, far-right Eurosceptic arguments generally revolve around the issue of national identity, and their policy prescriptions principally focus on the fields of immigration and financial bailouts to help other EU countries such as Greece. Far-right Eurosceptic parties generally see the fields of immigration and financial autonomy as the areas where the EU infringes most on traditional sovereignty. These two fields are also very visible, and thus good tools for rallying dissatisfied voters to their cause. In the case of immigrants, people can actually see foreigners living in their communities. European bailouts are also very visible, often occupying newspaper headlines. In contrast, the EU benefits such as increased trade surpluses are usually not noticed by the general public, and are instead mostly recognized by economists and intellectuals. This makes it easy for populist political parties to take advantage of the visibility of the issues of immigration and bailouts for political gain.

4.4. *The role of Minority Governments*

An important factor in the ability of far-right populist parties to actually express their Eurosceptic agenda at a national level seems to be the presence of a minority government in power, as is the case in the Netherlands and Denmark. Denmark was governed by a coalition of the Liberal Party and Conservative Peoples Party, with the Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen until October 2011. However, this coalition had a minority in parliament and thus had to rely on the votes of the DF to pass legislation.⁹² The support of the DF came at a high price, as it demanded concessions on immigration issues in exchange for support on

ety/2011-04-18/article-2436605/Skeptical-of-bailouts,-immigration,-True-Finns-rock-Finnish-election-and-stun-Europe/1.>

91. *Der Spiegel*, "Europäischer Rechtsruck: Auftritt der Anti-Euro-Krieger," 18.4.2011, last accessed 7 November 2011, <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,757699,00.html>>

92. Manfred Ertel, Marcel Rosenbach and Christoph Schult, "Spiral of Mistrust: Danish Threat to Schengen Agreement Under Fire," *Der Spiegel* on 16 May 2011, last accessed 10 June 2011, <<http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,762791,00.html>>

key policy areas. This was demonstrated in the reintroduction of Danish border controls, which the DF demanded in exchange for support of pension reforms.⁹³

Since 14 October 2010, the Netherlands has been ruled by a minority government for the first time since WW II. This government is a coalition between the People's Party for Freedom and Democracy and the Christian Democratic Appeal Party, and the prime minister is Mark Rutte.⁹⁴ This minority coalition is supported by Geert Wilders and his Freedom Party, which gives the party a disproportional amount of power and allows it to promote its Eurosceptic and Islamophobic views in the Dutch political system. Even though as of yet Wilders has been unable to implement his most radical ideas such as taxing headscarves and banning the Koran, his position in relation to the minority government has allowed him to significantly impact the political debate in such areas as immigration and the Dutch position towards the European Union.

5. Conclusion

With a closer comparative examination of Eurosceptic positions throughout the EU, it becomes clear that there are more commonalities than differences at a time where the permissive consensus for European integration has been revoked by the public in the member states. Overall, the parties offering Eurosceptic and nationalistic policy solutions are characterised by arguments based on Eurosceptic myths founded on a vague understanding of national identity, and the idea that the EU is an expensive endeavour. However, they make these assertions without offering (realistic) calculations for their arguments. Far-right parties propagate these arguments both out of ideological belief, and a desire to tap into anti-immigrant and anti-EU public sentiments in order to win elections. Usually, these arguments are not factually sustainable, but rather portray the EU as an 'other' that is endangering the sanctity of a country's national identity in some way. These national identities are rarely explained further, either by the Eurosceptic parties in Hungary and Romania or in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. These arguments based on national identity are generally used against all forms of mingling, i.e. of workers from within the EU or from third states, and against losing financial autonomy to the EU, the most recent case being a bail-out for Greece due to its financial difficulties.

While individual aspects of national identity are the basis for Eurosceptic parties, two differences remain between eastern and western European member states: while east European member states have a Communist past and their Eu-

93. Ibid.

94. *Deutsche Welle*, "Dutch minority government takes office," 14 October 2010, last accessed 5 August 2011, <<http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,6113336,00.html>>

rosceptic parties use local minorities (especially the Roma) as scapegoats, their west European counterparts rally against immigrants, most notably Muslim immigrant groups. In future research, it would be useful to take a closer look at the arguments used by Eurosceptic parties and how these can be countered constructively.

Abstract

By analysing commonalities and differences of Eurosceptic parties from five EU member states (Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), based on a definition and classification of Eurosceptic parties, this article shows that Euroscepticism in new member states should not be seen as a return to nationalism and a roll-back behind the accession process. When comparing Eurosceptics in new and old member states, Eurosceptic parties have to be seen as part of the Europeanization process: Where questions of European integration matter, there will be opponents voicing their fear of losing national identity through Eurosceptic parties.

Résumé

En étudiant les points communs et les différences entre les partis eurosceptiques de cinq états membres de l'Union européenne (Bulgarie, Finlande, Hongrie, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni), et en se fondant sur une définition et une classification des partis eurosceptiques, cet article démontre que l'euroscepticisme dans les nouveaux États membres ne devrait pas être perçu comme un retour au nationalisme ni à la période précédant le processus d'adhésion. Lorsque l'on compare les eurosceptiques dans les nouveaux et les anciens États membres, les partis eurosceptiques doivent être considérés comme une partie intégrante du processus d'europanisation: s'il est question de matières relevant de l'intégration européenne, il y aura toujours des opposants exprimant leur crainte de la perte de l'identité nationale à partir de ces partis eurosceptiques.